A search game with a protector

A classic problem in Search Theory is one in which a searcher allocates resources to the points of the integer interval [1, n] in an attempt to find an object which has been hidden in them using a known probability function. In this paper we consider a modification of this problem in which there is a protector who can also allocate resources to the points; allocating these resources makes it more difficult for the searcher to find an object. We model the situation as a two‐person non‐zero‐sum game so that we can take into account the fact that using resources can be costly. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium when the searcher's probability of finding an object located at point i is of the form (1 − exp (−λ_ix_i)) exp (−μ_iy_i) when the searcher and protector allocate resources x_i and y_i respectively to point i. An algorithm to find this Nash equilibrium is given. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47:85–96, 2000     

On a ruckle problem in discrete games of ambush

The following zero-sum game is considered. Red chooses in integer interval [1, n] two integer intervals consisting of k and m points where k + m < n, and Blue chooses an integer point in [1, n]. The payoff to Red equals 1 if the point chosen by Blue is at least in one of the intervals chosen by Red, and 0 otherwise. This work complements the results obtained by Ruckle, Baston and Bostock, and Lee. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 353–364, 1997     

Supplier‐buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation

We consider the problem of designing a contract to maximize the supplier's profit in a one‐supplier–one‐buyer relationship for a short‐life‐cycle product. Demand for the finished product is stochastic and price‐sensitive, and only its probability distribution is known when the supply contract is written. When the supplier has complete information on the marginal cost of the buyer, we show that several simple contracts can induce the buyer to choose order quantity that attains the single firm profit maximizing solution, resulting in the maximum possible profit for the supplier. When the marginal cost of the buyer is private information, we show that it is no longer possible to achieve the single firm solution. In this case, the optimal order quantity is always smaller while the optimal sale price of the finished product is higher than the single firm solution. The supplier's profit is lowered while that of the buyer is improved. Moreover, a buyer who has a lower marginal cost will extract more profit from the supplier. Under the optimal contract, the supplier employs a cutoff level policy on the buyer's marginal cost to determine whether the buyer should be induced to sign the contract. We characterize the optimal cutoff level and show how it depends on the parameters of the problem. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 41–64, 2001     

The stochastic joint replenishment problem: A new policy,analysis, and insights

In this study, we propose a new parsimonious policy for the stochastic joint replenishment problem in a single‐location, N‐item setting. The replenishment decisions are based on both group reorder point‐group order quantity and the time since the last decision epoch. We derive the expressions for the key operating characteristics of the inventory system for both unit and compound Poisson demands. In a comprehensive numerical study, we compare the performance of the proposed policy with that of existing ones over a standard test bed. Our numerical results indicate that the proposed policy dominates the existing ones in 100 of 139 instances with comparably significant savings for unit demands. With batch demands, the savings increase as the stochasticity of demand size gets larger. We also observe that it performs well in environments with low demand diversity across items. The inventory system herein also models a two‐echelon setting with a single item, multiple retailers, and cross docking at the upper echelon. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Decentralized admission control of a queueing system: A game‐theoretic model

Consider a distributed system where many gatekeepers share a single server. Customers arrive at each gatekeeper according to independent Poisson processes with different rates. Upon arrival of a new customer, the gatekeeper has to decide whether to admit the customer by sending it to the server, or to block it. Blocking costs nothing. The gatekeeper receives a reward after a customer completes the service, and incurs a cost if an admitted customer finds a busy server and therefore has to leave the system. Assuming an exponential service distribution, we formulate the problem as an n‐person non‐zero‐sum game in which each gatekeeper is interested in maximizing its own long‐run average reward. The key result is that each gatekeeper's optimal policy is that of a threshold type regardless what other gatekeepers do. We then derive Nash equilibria and discuss interesting insights. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 702–718, 2003.     

滑动导轨等部件的微动态特性

1.简介 这份报告给出了关于传统的滑动导轨系统的一些实验结果,同时论及了机构的精密运动控制。 这些年来,诸如导轨、丝杠和其他驱动机构等机械部件的微动态特性,换句话说,就是在很小位移范围内的非线性传递特性。已成为精密机械工程研究的首要问题。超精密仪器、机床和半导体生产系统都对机械部件的控制精度提出了越来越高的要求。对于精     

War reserve spares kits supplemented by normal operating assets

In peacetime, base stock levels of spares are determined on the assumption of normal resupply from the depot. In the event of war, however, a unit must be prepared to operate from stock on hand for a period of time without being resupplied from the depot. This paper describes a mathematical model for determining such war reserve spares (WRS) requirements. Specifically, the model solves the following kind of optimization problem: find the least-cost WRS kits that will keep the probability of a stockout after K cannibalizations less than or equal to some target objective α. The user of the model specifies the number of allowable cannibalizations, and the level of protection that the kit is supposed to provide. One interesting feature of this model is that in the probability computation it takes into account the possiblility of utilizing normal base operating assets. Results of a sensitivity analysis indicate that if peacetime levels were explicitly taken into account when designing a WRS kit, a cost saving of nearly 40 percent could be effected without degrading base supply performance in wartime.     

Damage to aircraft composite structures caused by directed energy system: A literature review

This paper presents a comprehensive review of the research studies on direct energy system effect on aircraft composite structures to develop a good understanding of state-of-the-art research and devel-opment in this area. The review begins with the application of composite materials in the aircraft structures and highlights their particular areas of application and limitations. An overview of directed energy system is given. Some of the commonly used systems in this category are discussed and the working principles of laser energy systems are described. The experimental and numerical studies re-ported regarding the aircraft composite structures subject to the effect of directed energy systems, especially the laser systems are reviewed in detail. In particularly, the general effects of laser systems and the relevant damage mechanisms against the composite structures are reported. The review draws attention to the recent research and findings in this field and is expected to guide engineers/researchers in future theoretical, numerical, and experimental studies.     

Reviews

Ian Castle and Ian Knight, Fearful Hard Times: The Siege and Relief of Eshowe, 1879. Greenhill Books, London 1994, Pp.256, 85 illus, 6 maps, index. £17.95. ISBN 1–85367–180–0.

Michael E. Brown (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and International Security. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, Pp.263, selected biblio, index. $45/£30 (cloth); $14.95/£12.95 (paper). ISBN 0–691–03368 and 00068–9.

Deborah Poole and Gerardo Renique, Peru: Time of Fear. London: Latin American Bureau (Research and Action) Ltd., 1992. Pp.212, 7 maps, photographs, glossary, sources/further reading, index. £17.99 ISBN 0–906156–70‐X and ‐71–8.

David A. Charters (ed.), Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution. Center for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, 1994. Pp.viii+220. NP.

Joachim Remak, A Very Civil War: The Swiss Sonderbund War of 1847. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993. Pp.xvi+221, 6 map's, 68 illus, biblio, index. $24.95/£16.95.